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LOYALTY TESTS FOR LAWYERS*
The information we have received from the Report of
the Conference Working Group,' together with the recent
survey published by Brown and Fassett,2 indicate the
extent to which loyalty tests are being imposed upon
lawyers and the nature of the tests imposed. At a time
when various agencies of government are concerning
themselves with the loyalty of labor leaders, entertainers,
United Nations employees, teachers, authors, newspa-
permen, and public employees generally, it is not sur-
prising to find such tests imposed upon lawyers. What
is unique about the lawyers' experience is that, with
very few exceptions, these tests have been imposed by,
or at least at the instance of, the bar itself.
That bar associations alone should solicit such treat-
ment for their members cannot, I believe, be taken as
evidence that lawyers generally are more susceptible to
the hysteria of our times than are other men. What it
does demonstrate is that we lawyers have allowed the
hysterical men among us to exercise a disproportionate
amount of influence. And in this instance the hysterical
men have had the full support of the American Bar
Association, which organization, representing as it does
less than 25% of the lawyers in the country, itself has
a disproportionate influence on state and local bar asso-
ciations.
The welter of political tests which the ABA has pro-
posed since 1950, together with the tests now in effect
in some states, employ one of two methods for detecting
disloyalty: (I) the test oath, and (2) investigation, in-
cluding interrogation of the suspect, either in admission
or in disbarment proceedings. The objectives-the sorts
of men to be excluded from the profession--can only be
described as those with some sort of attachment, frat-
ernal, philosophical or coincidental, to the Communist
Party or to policies attributed to the Communist Party.
In my judgment, each of these methods and each of
these objectives is not only unwise but positively harm-
ful-and this for reasons which, in calmer times and
even in some instances now, would lead to their being
held unconstitutional. I do not rest this conclusion on
any defects in the form of the proposals which could
be cured, without altering their substance, by improved
draftsmanship. Nor do I rest on any argument about
e.r post facto laws-an argument which, as Brown and
Fassett observe, would render many of the proposed
tests "a little bit unconstitutional" at the outset, but
* An address to the National Conference on Threats to the
Independence of the Bar held in New York, on October 17,
1953, under the auspices of the National Lawyers Guild.
1. 13 Law. Guild Rev. 158 (1954).
2. Brown and Fassett, Loyalty Tests for Admission to the
Bar (1953) 20 U. Chi. L. Rev. 480.
which would lose its applicabifity with the passage of
time.3 Rather, I base my conclusion on the following
four propositions:
1. Government action to exclude an individual
from the legal- profession for any reason should be
based on a rational system of proof, and this re-
quirement should be found, and has in times past
been found, in the due process clause.
To the extent that loyalty tests for lawyers direct
administrative agencies or courts to exclude from the
profession on the basis of membership in, affiliation
with, support of, or fellow-traveling with the Commu-
nist Party (whether the Party be specifically named or
otherwise described), they attempt to impose upon the
agency or court an irrational system of proof. Ob-
viously, the policy behind such tests, and any argument
in defense of their ionstitutionality under the First
Amendment, cannot be aimed at the bare fact of the
individual's connection with the organization. This con-
nection is a subject of concern, and a valid basis for
exclusion from the profession, only if three assumptions
are made: (1) That at least one purpose of the organi-
zation is such that, if entertained by an individual, it
would be a proper ground for excluding him from the
profession; (2) that every person connected with the
organization in the proscribed manner has, by his
connection, become aware of that purpose; and (3) fur-
ther by his connection has adopted that purpose as his
own.
The last two of these assumptions are so contrary
to all human experience that they can be made only by
one who goes beyond the position taken by the ABA,
that those covered by its tests have "ceased to be Aneri-
cans," 4 and concludes also that they have ceased to be
human.
Ten years ago in the Schneiderman case--which in-
volved an admitted member and national officer of the
Communist Party-the Supreme Court refused to adopt
this sort of reasoning. "[U]nder our traditions," the
Court said, "beliefs are personal and not a matter of
mere association, and ... men in adhering to a political
party or other'organization notoriously do not subscribe
unqualifiedly to all of its platforms or asserted prin-
ciples."
Two weeks earlier, in Tot v. U. S.,' the Court had
decided that the due process clause forbade Congress, in
3. Ibid., 486-487.
4. ABA, Brief on Communism: Marxism-Leninism (1951),
28.
5. Schneiderman v. U. S., 320 U. S. 118 (1943).
6. 319 U. S.463 (1943).
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its attempt to prevent ex-convicts from receiving fire-
arms in interstate commerce, to resort to a presumption
-- even a rebuttable presumption-that all firearms found
in the possession of such persons had been received
by them in' interstate transactions. There was, it was
apparent to the Court, "no rational connection between
the fact proved and the ultimate fact presumed," and due
process is violated when "the inference of the one from
the proof of the other is arbitrary because of lack of
connection between the two in common experience"-
"where the inference is so strained as not to have a
reasonable relation to the circumstances of life as we
know them." The Tot case announced no new constitu-
tional principle-it merely reiterated a due process re-
quirement which has long been applied to statutory pre-
sumptions, whether the statute involved defined a crime,
7
prescribed a measure of tort liability,8 laid down rules
governing the operation of business, 9 or defined grounds
for revoking citizenship.' 0 Due process forbids the leg-
islature, for whatever purpose, to impose irrational pre-
sumptions upon adjudicatory bodies.
These two cases might be thought both to establish
the constitutional principle upon which the doctrine of
guilt-by-association is rejected and to evidence what
the Court considered to be permissible inferences from
Communist Party membership in view of "the circum-
stances of life." But these decisions were ten years ago
and many things-including the personnel of the Court--
have changed. In the interval have occurred the Korean
war, additional revelations of Congressional committees,,
some espionage trials, and the Smith Act prosecutions
which are taken to have estabilshed that the Communist
Party advocates forcible overthrow of the government."
While these developments may be thought to improve
our understanding of the objectives of the Communist
Party, they do not, it seems to me, so alter our'under-
standing of human nature that we can now assume that
every member of the Party-and certainly not every one
connected with the Party in the manner described in the
loyalty tests-(1) understands the Party objectives as
we do, and (2) takes them as his own.
The Supreme Court obviously agrees as to the first
assumption. It has twice 12 avoided a constitutional ques-
tion by reading into loyalty tests for public officers and
7. Morrison v. California, 291 U. S. 82 (1934) ; Manley v.
Georgia, 279 U. S. 1 (1928)'; Bailey v. Alabama, 291 U. S. 82
(1911).
8. Western & Atlantic R. Co. v. Henderson, 279 U. S. 639
(1929) ; Mobile J. & K. C. R. Co. v. Turnipseed, 219 U. S. 35
(1910).
9. McFarland v. American Sugar Refining Co., 241 U. S. 79
(1916); Lindsey v. National Carbonic Gas Co., 220 U. S. 61
(1911).
10. Luriav. U. S., 231 U. S. 9 (1913).
11. See Dennis v. U. S., 341 U. S. 494 (1951).
12. Gercnde v. Board of Supervisors, 341 U. S. 56 (1951);
Garner v. Los Angeles Board, 341 U. S. 716 (1951). •
employees, based upon membership or affiliation in or-
ganizations, the requirement that the individual involved
know of the organization's proscribed purpose; and only
last year in the Wientan case"r it found due process vio-
lated by an Oklahoma loyalty test which excluded the
knowledge requirement.
But, while the first assumption is still regarded as
constitutionally irrational, the second one-that every
person connected with the organization accepts all its
purposes as his own-apparently has gained rationality
in the past ten years. Loyalty tests based on knowing
membership are now perfectly constitutional so far as
the due process clause is concerned.'
4
True, none of these cases, involve loyalty tests for
lawyers. But I would not attempt to distinguish them
by pointing out that the assumption on which they are'
based is clearly erroneous as applied to lawyers-that,
to cite just one instance, at least twenty-six members
of the ABA, being fully informed of the position taken
by the Association on loyalty oaths for lawyers, rejected
the position but retained their membership. 15 Such facts
do not demonstrate that lawyers are not human, or that
they differ in some fundamental respect from other hu-
mans. Such facts- demonstrate that the Court is
wrong.' 6
2. The application in individual cases of any
government policy of exclusion from the legal
profession should not be made by the legislature,
and any such legislative adjudication used to be,
13. Wie,nn v. Updegraff, 344 U. S. 183 (1952).
14. Gerende v. Board of Supervisors, note 12, supra; Garner
v. Los Angeles Board, note 12, supra; Adler v. Board of Educa-
tion, 342 U. S. 485 (1952). Adler is most explicit on this
point: "Membership in a listed organization found to be within
the statute and known by the member to be within the statute
is a legislative finding that the member by his membership sup-
ports the thing the organization stands for, namely, the over-
throw of government by unlawful means. We cannot say that
such a finding is contrary to fact or that 'generality of experi-
ence' points to a different conclusion. Disqualification follows
therefore as a reasonable presumption from such membership
and support." True, the Court made much of the fact that the
Feinberg Law makes membership in proscribed organizations
only "prima facie evidence of disqualification," so that the final
conclusion was, "Where, as here, the relation between the fact
found and the presumption is clear and direct and is not con-
elusive, the requirements of due process are satisfied." But the
fact that the presumption is rebuttable does not make it more
rational. Tot v. U. S., note 6, supra. In any event, the similar
presumptions employed in Gerende and Garner are not rebuttable
-knowing membership disqualifies absolutely.
15. The Proposed Anti-Communist Oath: Opposition Ex-
pressed to Association's Policy (1951) 37 ABAJ 123.
16. I do not overlook the argument made by some-though
not by the Supreme Court-that people who join the Communist
Party put themselves in a unique position: they dare not dis-
agree with official Party policy for fear of expulsion from the
Party, and they dare not be expelled for fear of other dire
consequences which may follow. This argument takes its
information about the "iron discipline" and terroristic methods
of the Party from the self-contradictory testimony of ex-Party
members who also testify that they departed from the Party
because of disagreements over policy and that they departed
unscathed.
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and should still be, held invalid as a bill of at-
tainder,
The due process objection which I have discussed
above is applicable to the situation where the legislature
leaves the determination of individual cases where it
should be left-to the adjudicatory process-but at-
tempts to encroach upon that process by imposing ir-
rational presumptions. Somewhat related to that
problem, but different from it and objectionable in even
greater degree, is the situation where the legislature seeks
to eliminate the adjudicatory process entirely, and take
over for itself the determination of individual cases. In
such instances, the legislature runs afoul of the pro-
hibition against bills of attainder.
17
"A bill of attainder," said the Supreme Court on the
first occasion of its considering the question,'8 "is a legis-
lative act which inflicts punishment without judicial
trial"-and it defined punishment to embrace exclusion
from a profession, including specifically the legal pro-
fession. About the vice of such acts the Court was
clear: the legislature is "creating the deprivation without
any of the ordinary forms and guards provided for the
security of the citizen in the administration of justice
by the established tribunals." (Emphasis added.)
Or, as Story put it:
"In such cases, the legislature assumes judicial mag-
istry, pronouncing upon the guilt of the party without
any of the common forms and guards of trial, and
satisfying itself with proofs, when such proofs are
within its reach, whether they are conformable to the
rules of evidence or not. In short, in all such cases,
the legislature exercises the highest power of sov-
ereignty, and what may be properly deemed an ir-
responsible despotic discretion, being governed solely
by what it deems political necessity or expediency,
and too often under the influence of unreasonable-
fears or unfounded suspicions.'' 19
The objection, in other words, is to the process by
which the determination is made-a process in which
the individual affected is deprived of all the safeguards
available when a judicial body imposes punishment.'
0
It matters not that in any particular case the legislature
may have acted on rational and adequately tested proof
in applying a perfectly constitutional standard. The
17. On this point I am greatly indebted to, though not in full
agreement with, Wormuth, Legislative Disqualifications as Bills
of Attainder (1951) 4 Vand. L. Rev. 603.
18. Cummings v. Missouri, 4 Wall. 277 (1866) ; Ex parte
Garland, 4 Wall. 333 (1866).
19. Story, Commentaries on The Constitution (5th Ed.,
1891) §1344.
20. It is, therefore, an objection to deprivations imposed by
rule of court as well as by statute. Ex parte Garland, note 18,
supra.
difficulty is that the legislative process does not insure
such a basis for action and does not provide a record
showing that such proof was present or, indeed, showing
what standard was applied.
Either such legislative action must be forbidden or
we are to continue to be treated to spectacles like that
afforded in the Douds case. 21 In that case, Chief Justice
Vinson found that the undeclared Congressional policy
in imposing the non-Communist oath on union officers
was to avoid political strikes, and that the determination
that that policy applied to Communists was supported
by ex parte and hearsay testimony in Congressional
hearings. In the same case, Justice Jackson's opinion
found that the policy was to protect labor unions from
domination by "a conspiratorial and revolutionary junta,
organized to reach ends and to use methods . . . incom-
patible with our constitutional system," and that the
application of this policy to Communists was supported
by "materials which Congress may or could have con-
sidered."
The constitutional prohibition against such legislative
acts is of course violated when the legislative sanction
is visited on named individuals, as was held in the Lovett
case.2 2 But the objection to the act is not removed if
the legislature, instead of listing the individuals sought
to be reached, omits their names and substitutes, as a
condition of avoiding the sanction, an oath which an
identifiable class of persons cannot take. Hence, the
Supreme Court once struck down legislative acts which
required, as a condition, pursuit of the calling of a
priest or a a lawyer, oaths disclaiming participation in
or sympathy for the Confederate cause during the Civil
War.2 3 The attainder objection applies, the Court said,
whether the statute is "directed against individuals by
name" or is "directed against a whole class." "The exac-
tion of the oath is the mode provided for ascertaining
the parties upon whom the act is intended to operate,
and instead of lessening, increases its objectionable char-
acter."
If this were all, it would seem clear that both the
reason for the constitutional prohibition and the Supreme
Court's interpretation of that prohibition demonstrate
the invalidity of legislative attempts to foreclose judicial
inquiry into fitness for practice by imposing oath require-
ments which include all who cannot disclaim certain
beliefs and affiliations. Unfortunately, however, Justice
Frankfurter started a new trend in constitutional in-
terpretation on this point in his concurring opinion in
21. American Communications Association v. Douds, 339
U. S. 382 (1950).
22. U. S. v. Lovett, 328 U. S. 303 (1946).
23. Cumnmnings v. Missouri, note 18, supra; Ex Parte Garland,
note 18, supra.
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the Lovett case, 24 where he undertook to explain about
bills of attainder:
"There was always a declaration of guilt either of
the individual or the class to which he belonged. The
offense might be a pre-existing crime or an act made
punishable ex post facto. Frequently, a bill of attain-
der was thus doubly objectionable because of its ex
post facto features. This is the historic explanation
for uniting the two mischiefs in one clause-'No Bill
of Attainder or ex post facto Law shall be passed'."
This interpretation very nearly reads the bill of at-
tainder prohibition out of the Constitution. The ex post
facto provision will invalidate legislative attempts to
give new standards retroactive application to past con-
duct. Save for some useless overlapping of the ex post
facto provision, the attainder provision applies only to
legislative adjudication of individual guilt under a pre-
viously-defined standard. But legislative adjudications
against individuals based on present or future conduct
by applying a standard which was not identified until
the moment the legislature acts-if, indeed, it is identi-
fied then-are not covered by this clause at all.
- Presumably such legislative action should be-though
it has not been-invalidated under "other provisions of
the Constitution" (certainly under the due process
clauses) which Justice Frankfurter assures us are "ef-
fectively designed to assure the liberties of our citizens."
But, unless those provisions are to be found outside the
Bill of Rights and the Fourteenth Amendment, they
throw little -light on the interpretation to be given a
clause in the original Constitution. As Professor Wor-
muth has said: "If Mr. Justice Frankfurter is right,
the state legislatures, from 1789 to 1868, were in no way
restrained by the Federal Constitution from putting a
man to death by vote, if only his life had been so blame-
less that he escaped all reproach for past conduct. Prob-
ably the framers did not intend this. ' 25
Nonetheless, Justice Frankfurter's interpretation
seems now to prevail, or to be on the verge of prevailing.
In the Douds cases, 26 Chief Justice Vinson, writing for
himself and Justices Reed, Burton and Minton, found no
objection under the attainder clause because the oaths
reached only to present beliefs and affiliations so that
anyone "by a voluntary alteration of the loyalties which
impel him to action" could become eligible to sign the
oath.
27
24. U. S. v. Lovett, note 22, supra.
25. Wormuth, note 17, supra.
26. American Communications Association v. Douds, note 21,
supra; Osman v. Douds, 339 U. S. 846 (1950).
27. In Garner v. Los Angeles Board, note 12, supra, the
Court also pointed out that the test oath there involved applied
"prospectively operative standards of qualification and eligibility
for public employment." (Emphasis added.) But, as will be
That Justice Frankfurter's views on this question
should prevail seems to me to be a serious mistake which
is made only by disregarding the purpose behind the
attainder prohibition. One objection to such a use of
the legislative process is that it provides no safeguards
as to what may be taken as proof. Another, and equally
serious, objection is that the legislative process may
operate without reference to a previously-defined stan-
dard. Justice Frankfurter's interpretation would apply
the prohibition where the legislature acts with reference
to a pre-existing standard, but would hold the prohibi-
tion inapplicable where the legislature acts without ref-
erence to such a standard.
This was not the Court's understanding of attainder
in 186611 nor in 1946 when in the Lovett case" it recog-
nized the double aspect of the attainder objection:
"No one would think that Congress could have
passed a valid law, stating that after investigation it
had found Lovett, Dodd and Watson 'guilty' of the
crime of engaging in 'subversive activities,' defined
that term for the first time, and sentenced them to
perpetual exclusion from any government employ-
ment. Section 304, while it does not use that language,
accomplishes that result. The effect was to inflict
punishment without the safeguard of a judicial trial
and 'determined by no previous law or fixcd rule.' The
Constitution declares that that cannot be done either
by a State or by the United States." (Emphasis sup-
plied.)
That also is the effect of loyalty oaths imposed as a
condition to entering or remaining in the legal profes-
sion. The change in the Court's inirpretation of the
attainder clause does not remove the objectionable fea-
tures of attainder.
indicated later, the fact that the oaths were considered "qualifi-
cations for public employment" probably avoids the attainder
objection anyway.
28. Cummings v. Missouri, note 18, supra, quotes with ap-
proval Gaines v. Buford, I Dana 481 (1833) : "A British Act
of Parliament might declare that if certain individuals, or a
class of individuals, failed to do a given act by a named day,
they should be deemed to be, and treated as convicted felons or
traitors. Such an act comes precisely within the definition of a
bill of attainder, and the English courts would enforce it with-
out indictment or trial by jury." And the Court in Cummings
went on to say: "If these clauses * * * had declared that all
priests and clergymen within the State of Missouri were guilty
of these acts * * * and hence [should] be subjected to the like
deprivation, the clauses would be equally open to objection.
And, further, if these clauses had declared that all such priests
and clergymen should be so held guilty, and be thus deprived,
provided they did not, by a day designated, do certain specified
acts, they would be no less within the inhibitions of the Federal
Constitution. In all these cases there would be the legislative
enactment creating the deprivation without any of the ordinary
forms and guards provided for the security of the citizen in the
administration of justice by the established tribunals."
29. U. S. v. Lovett, note 22, supra.
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3. The power to exclude from the legal pro-
fession should not be used to compel any person
to incriminate himself, and any such use of the
power violates the constitutional guarantees
against self-incrimination and, in some instances,
the due process clause.
Objections to loyalty tests based upon the constitu-
tional privilege against self-incrimination may arise in
at least two different forms. I shall dispose of one of
them briefly.
The most recent ABA proposal is that the mere fact
that a lawyer invokes the privilege, should itself be
treated as disclosing "disqualification for the practice of
the law."3' 0 Such treatment would, in a very real sense,
be an exercise of the power to exclude from the profes-
sion in such a way as to compel the attorney to forfeit
the privilege, and should be held unconstitutional for
that reason. I am aware that the power to discharge
public employees on such grounds has been sanctioned
in a number of state cases, most of them involving police-
men. Most of these cases are disposed of on the argu-
ment that, since the duties of the policeman consist of
"preventing the commission of crime, of assisting in its
detection, and of disclosing all information known to
them which may lead to the apprehension and punish-
ment of" criminals, "it is a violation of said duties for any
police officer to refuse to disclose pertinent facts" about
crime.31  From this analysis emerges the conclusion
that the constitutional privilege must necessarily give
way. Without taking time to discuss the infirmities of
this argument3 2 or the unhappy lot of the policeman, I
put the cases to one side. For the mist which clouds the
judicial eye as it contemplates the policeman derelict in
his duty seems to disappear when the privilege is in-
voked by an attorney. So far as I can discover, in the
few cases where the question has arisen, the fact that an
attorney has invoked the privilege against self-incrimina-
tion has been held to constitute no evidence of unfitness
for practice. The judicial- verdict is apparently unani-
mous: "The constitutional privilege is a fundamental
right and a measure of duty: its exercise cannot be a
breach of duty to the court."' s
That verdict, insofar as- it is based on the privilege
against self-incrimination, is not one which is compelled
by anything in the federal constitution. The states are
30. New York Times, August 26, 1953, p. 1, col. 1.
31. The quotations are from Chistal v. Police Commission,
33 Cal. App. (2d) 564. 92 P, (2d) 416 (1939), the leadinz case.
32. See Notes (1953) 101 U. Pa. L. Rev. 1190, (1951) 64
Harv. L. Rev. 987.
33. Matter of Grae, 282 N. Y. 428, 26 NE (2d) 963, 127
ALR 1276 (1940). See also Matter of Ells. 282 N. Y. 435,
26 NE (2d) 967 (1940) ; In re Holland. 377 Il1. 346, 36 NE
(2d) 543 (1941) ; Ex Porte Marshall, 165 Miss. 523, 147 So.
791 (1933).
not required to confer the privilege.
8 4 But if they do
confer it, and then treat its invocation as evidence of
facts which would disqualify for .the practice of law, they
may run afoul of due process in employing an irrational
presumption. When the Court, in Adamson v. Cali-
fornia, 5 upheld a California rule permitting comment
upon a defendant's failure to testify in a criminal case
it was careful to point out that, "This does not involve
any presumption rebuttable or irrebuttable, either of
guilt or of the truth of any fact that is offered in evi-
dence. Compare Tot v. United States." And it hypo-
_thesized, as an example of a violation of due process,
"a statute [which] might declare that a permitted re-
fusal to testify would compel an acceptance of the truth
of the prosecution's evidence."
But objections to loyalty tests based upon the self-
incrimination privilege run beyond the problem in this
simple form. They obtain, I believe, whenever a test
oath, or answers to interrogation, on incriminating
matters are required as a prerequisite to admission
or continuation in the profession. For oaths and
interrogations of the sort we are here considering, as
distinguished from the traditional oath to support
the constitution, are "instruments of compulsory dis-
closure." 6
And it was the fight against just such forms of com-
pulsory disclosure which led to the establishment of the
privilege against self-incrimination in the first place.
That fight had its origins in a period in English history
when the use of the ex officio oath by the ecclesiastical
courts, the High Commission and the Star Chamber had
"degenerate[d] into a merely unlawful process of poking
about in the speculation of finding something charge-
able. ' 3 7 And it was John Lilburn's refusal to submit to
just such an interrogation by the Star Chamber-an in-
terrogation which reached into matters not covered by
any charge against himSS-which led Parliament to
vacate his sentence and to enact statutes which abolished
the High Commission and the Star Chamber and forbade
the administration of the oath ex officio in criminal
proceedings in the ecclesiastical courts.
34. Twining v. New Jersey, 211 U. S. 78 (1908).
35. 332 U. S. 46 (1947).
36. Koenigsburg and Stavis, Test Oaths; Henry VIII to
The American Bar Association (1951) 11 Law. Guild Rev. 111.
37. 8 Wigmore, Evidence (3rd Ed., 1940), 284. See also
Koenighburg and Stavis, note 36, supra; Wolfram, John Lil-
burn, Democracy's Pillar of Fire (1952) 3 Syracuse Law Rev.
213.
38. Lilburn's refusal was in these terms: "I am not willing
to answer you to any more of these questions, because I see you
go about this examination to ensnare me; for, seeing the things
for which I am imprisoned cannot be proved against me, you
will get other matter out of my examination; and therefore if
you will not ask me about the thing laid to my charge, I shall
answer no more. * * *" The Trial of Lilburn and Wharton,
3 How. St. Tr. 1315 (1637).
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Hence, the privilege was first recognized as a protec-
tion in what Wigmore calls "preliminary inquisition of
one not yet charged,"3 9 and only came later to be rec-
ognized as available to any accused duly charged in' a
criminal proceeding, and to an ordinary witness in crim-
inal and non-criminal proceedings.
In this original form, as well as in its later develop-
ments, the privilege is recognized under our constitu-
tional guarantees. "The whole principle of the grand
jury [or other formal presentment] presupposes a for-
mal and deliberate accusation, based on probable cause,
before any person is called to answer for a crime. * * *"
In this aspect the privilege against self-incrimination is,
in history and in policy, its just complement, in so far
as it exempts all persons from being compelled to dis-
close their supposed offences before formal process of
charge is had.
40
It was under this original interpretation of the privi-
lege that coerced confessions were first,4I and perhaps
still are, 42 excluded in the federal courts; it is upon
this reading of the privilege that they are excluded by
many state courts. 42  It is the privilege in this form
which is available in grand jury proceedings, 44 legisla-
tive investigations4 and police interrogations. 46 In this
form, the privilege should be available in proceedings
for admission to or exclusion from the bar.
In Lilburn's day the compulsions employed to force
self-incrimination were the lash and the pillory. In later
days the more usual form came to be the commitment
for contempt. But the constitutional guaranty is con-
cerned with the fact, not the form, of compulsion. Hence
it is that compulsion to testify in the form of forfeiture
of goods was held to violate the guarantee. 47 Hence it
is, also, that the English courts long ago concluded that
where a disbarment proceeding against a lawyer was
based upon charges which describe an indictable offense,
the proceeding should not be initiated by a rule calling
upon the attorney to answer personally, since this would
require him to testify as to incriminating matters, but
should be initiated by a show cause order, under which
he might clear himself without testifying 4S-or might at
least raise doubts as to his guilt, in which case the dis-
39. 8 Wigmore, Evidence (3rd Ed., 1940), 307.
40. Ibid., 308.
41. Brain v. U. S., 168 U. S. 532 (1897).
42. See U. S. v. Carignan, 342 U. S. 36 (1951).
43. Morgan, The Privilege Against Self-Incrimination
(1943) 34 Minn. L. Rev. 1, 28.
44. Counselman v. Hitchcock, 142 U. S. 547 (1892); Blau
v. U. S., 340 U. S. 159 (1950). The state cases are collected
in 8 Wigmore, Evidence (3rd Ed., 1940), 325, note 12.
45. 8 Wigmore, Evidence (3rd Ed., 1940), 326, note 13;
Morgan, note 43, supra, 30-34; Note (1949) 49 Col. L. Rev. 87.
46. Meltzer, Required Records, The McCarran Act and The
Privilege Against Self-Incrimination (1951) 18 U. Chi. L. Rev.
687, 693-698; Note (1953) 5 Stanford L. Rev. 459.
47. Boydv. U. S., 116U. S. 616 (1885).
48. Stephens v. Hill, 10 M. & W. 28 (1842).
barment proceedings should await the outcome of crim-
inal proceedings. 49 And it was with a full understand-
ing of the English rule's basis in the privilege against
self-incrimination that the Supreme Court employed that
rule to test the propriety of a federal disbarment pro-
ceeding seventy years ago.50
This recognition that the threat of exclusion from a
profession constitutes compulsion should lead to the in-
validation of all test oaths and answers to interrogation
exacted as a condition to practicing the profession where
those oaths and interrogations inquire into matters in-
criminating under the Smith Act and the numerous
other criminal sedition laws.
If this result is not dictated by precedent, neither is
it forbidden by precedent. The argument has been con-
sidered by a court, so far as I can discover, only once
51
-and that time it was sustained. Before Ex parte Gar-
land52 was decided, the attorney's oath there involved
was attacked in another proceeding on the ground,
among others, that it compelled the attorney to be a
witness against himself, and Federal District Judge
Busteed agreed :53
"Is not this [oath requirement] in fact to oblige a
man to be a witness against himself? * * * It is
unworthy of the great question to say that a man is
not obliged to put himself in the supposed dilemma;
that all he has to do is not to attempt the practice of
his profession in the national courts, and he will not
run the risk of testifying to his own guilt. This
is the merest and shallowest sophistry. If he keeps
silence, he is thereby deprived of a constitttional
right; if he speak, he becomes 'a witness against
himself'."
Whatever Judge Busteed may lack in judicial rank
or fame he makes up in common sense. That such
oaths operate to compel self-incrimination can be denied
only by resort to "the merest and shallowest sophistry."
4. Exclusion from the legal profession, regard-
less of the method employed, should never be
based on political beliefs, affiliations or advocacy,
and any such exclusion violates the guarantees of
the First Amendment.
Any such rule for exclusion from a profession con-
stitutes, as Chief Justice Vinson recognized in the Douds
49. In re Hill, L.R. 3 Q.B. 543 (1868).
50. Ex parte Wall, 107 U. S. 265 (1882).
51. The self-incrimination point was not raised in the Douds,
Gerende, Adler or Weirnan cases. It was raised in the state
courts in the Garner case (Transcript of Record, U. S. Supreme
Court, No. 453, October Term, 1950, at p. 9), but was not there
considered. See Garner v. Board of Public Works, 98 Cal.
App. (2d) 493, 220 P. (2d) 958 (1950).
52. Note 18, supra.
53. In re Shorter, Fed. Cas. No. 12,811 (D.C. Ala., 1865).
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case, 54 a "partial abridgment" of First Amendment
rights. Since that is precisely what the First Amend-
ment prohibits, this should be the end of the matter.
But it is not the end of the matter and it never has
been-because the courts have never been willing to
accept, in hard cases, what they eloquently proclaim in
the easy ones.
No more eloquent formulation of the principle em-
bodied in the First Amendment has been made than
that of Justice Jackson, speaking for a majority of the
Court in the Barnette case 35-a case dealing with an
eccentric religious idea about requiring school children
to salute the flag:
"If there is any fixed star in our constitutional con-
stellation it is that no official, high or petty, can pre-
scribe what shall be orthodox in politics, nationalism,
religion, or other matters of opinion or force citizens
to confess by word or act their faith therein. If there
are any circumstances which permit an exception,
they do not now occur to us."
But when the Court is confronted with ideas more
obnoxious or alarming than those of Jehovah's Wit-
nesses, the star becomes unfixed and exceptions occur.
One exception exists for speech which creates a "clear
and present danger"-an epigrammatic but essentially
meaningless phrase conceived by Justice Holmes in an
attempt to give the First Amendment more content than
the Court had previously given it,56 and a phrase which
is now reduced to complete absurdity by the recent ren-
dering in the Dennis case57 which finds the requisite
danger in advocacy of forcible overthrow "as speedily
as circumstances would permit." (Who ever advocated
any action any sooner?)
But "clear and present danger," whatever that may
mean, does not exhaust the categories of exceptions.
Other exceptions lie, as Chief Justice Vinson has re-
cently reminded us, in "the considerations that gave
birth" to that exception. 5s
In dealing with exclusions from public employment
which abridge rights guaranteed by the First Amend-
ment or by other constitutional provisions, the appro-
priate exception was once expressed in another Holmes
epigram: "The petitioner may have a constitutional right
to talk politics, but he has no constitutional right to be
a policeman." 5 Later, it was explained somewhat more
elaborately that since public employment was a "privi-
54. American Communications Association v. Douds, note 21,
supra.
55. West Virginia State Board of Education v. Barnette,
318 U. S. 624 (1942).
56. Schenck v. U. S., 249 U. S. 47 (1919).
57. Dennis v. U. S., note 11, supra.
58. American Communications Association v. Douds, note 21,
supra.
59. McAuliffe v. Mayor, 155 Mass. 216, 29 N.E. 517 (1892).
lege" which the state could withhold, it could impose
any conditions upon a grant of that privilege-including
forfeiture of constitutional rights.8 0 Since United Public
Workers v. Mitchell"' this exception seems to have been
limited somewhat-the impairment of constitutional
rights may not go beyond forbidding what may be "rea-
sonably deemed .. . to interfere with the efficiency of
the public service." But the exception will still accom-
modate loyalty tests for public officers and employees-
such tests merely establish "reasonable qualifications" for
office or employment. And in such cases, at least, the
exception seems to cover not only the First Amend-
ment, 2 but also the prohibition against bills of attain-
der.
63
All of this seems to me to be poor constitutional in-
terpretation. I agree with Alexander Meiklejohn that
the First Amendment was intended to guarantee the
right of political advocacy, including advocacy of revolu-
tion, against legislative abridgment 4-- that it was
intended to place such advocacy beyond legislative reach
whether the legislature is attempting to suppress "clear
and present dangers" or to prescribe vocational qualifica-
tions. But I shall not take time to debate that
proposition here. For even under the "reasonable
qualifications" exception, which has been applied in other
contexts to licensed vocations as well as to public em-
ployees, 5 the First Amendment is violated when loyalty
tests are applied to lawyers. The "reasonable qualifica-
tions" exception cannot rationally be made to accom-
modate such tests.60
To state my position in its baldest form-and in a
form broad enough to cover all loyalty tests based on
political belief, speech or association-one who personal-
ly advocates the forcible overthrow of the government
does not, by such advocacy, demonstrate his unfitness
to practice law. This brings me into flat conflict with
60. Hale. Unconstitutional Conditions and Constitutional
Rights (1935) 35 Col. L. Rev. 321; Note (1953) 28 Ind. L. J.
520.
61. 330 U. S. 75 (1946).
62. Adler v. Board of Education, note 14, supra; In re
Summers, 325 U. S. 561 (1945).
63. Gerende v. Board of Supervisors, note 12, supra; Garner
v. Los Angeles Board, note 12, supra.
64. See Meiklejohn, What Does The First Amendment
Mean? (1953) 20 U. Chi. L. Rev. 461.
65. Hawker v. New York, 170 U. S. 189 (1898) ; Gray v.
Connecticut, 159 U. S. 74 (1895) ; Dent v. West Virginia, 129
U. S. 114 (1889).
66. Nor can it rationally be made to accommodate a require-
ment that a lawyer be willing to serve in the state militia.
In re Summers, note 62, supra, makes no attempt to demonstrate
anything to the contrary. The decision is justified solely on
the ground that Illinois treats lawyers no worse than the federal
government-under the Supreme Court's interpretation of a
federal statute-treats aliens seeking citizenship. Since the
Supreme Court revised its interpretation of the statute in Girou-
ard v. U. S., 328 U. S. 61 (1946), that justification--if it was
a justification-is no longer available.
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Brown and Fassett,O7 who regard a loyalty test based
on such personal advocacy as at least acceptable and
constitutional, though perhaps not desirable.
Their defense of such a test is under the "reasonable
qualifications" exception. They consider the test to
have a bearing on the lawyer's professional fitness. To
demonstrate the connection, they begin with a resolution
recently adopted by the Association of American Law
Schools
68 
.which says in part:-
"A belief in lawful procedures may properly be de-
manded of one who undertakes to be a teacher of law.
Whatever ideals he may cherish, he must be willing to
work for a realization of them within the framework
of orderly, lawful and democratic processes. The
teacher of law with no real belief in the principle of
legality is a contradiction in terms."
To this they add: "Since constitutions are our funda-
mental source of legality, a willingness to support and
defend our constitutional system (which includes pro-
cedures for its orderly alteration) would seem to be a
prerequisite for a lawyer's faithful performance of his
duties as a lawyer." 9
This seems to me to be as large a piece of nonsense
as saying that a man who advocates forcible overthrow
of the government can be excluded from the plumber's
trade because he may break the pipes.
The analogy highlights the error. Our hypothetical
plumber believes in force as a method of altering govern-
ment, not as a method of plumbing. So a lawyer may
believe in force as a method for governmental change
without believing in it as a method of practising law.
The fact that he believes in, and advocates, such a method
of governmental change cannot be rationally made to
show that he will ever represent the interests of any
client, in court or outside of court, by any other than
67. Brown and Fassett, note 2, supra, at 502. Although they
speak at this point of overthrow by "unconstitutional means,"
their later elaboration of the subject demonstrates that "force
and violence" are the means with which they are concerned.
68. Proceedings of The Association of American Law
Schools (1951), 61, 99.
69. Brown and Fassett, note 2, supra, at 481. 1 take it that
while the "support and defend our constitutional system" phrase-
ology resembles that employed in the traditional lawyers oath,
that fact is not supposed to give the argument for constitu-
tionality of loyalty tests additional weight. Brown and Fassett
do not suggest that the traditional oath has any specific constitu-
tional sanction. It has only if the oath prescribed by U. S.
Const., Art. 6, Cl. 3, for state and federal legislative, executive
and "judicial officers" is applicable to lawyers. But the history
of that requirement indicates that it was imposed to buttress
the supremacy clause, so that state judges "will * * * not
judicially determine in favor of their state laws," and that it
was made applicable to federal officers simply to make it more
palatable to the states. 1 Farrand, Records of The Federal
Convention (Rev. Ed., 1937), 203, 207; 2 Ibid., 87-88. The
constitutional oath has been held inapplicable to grand jurors
on the theory that it extends not to "all who attend the ad-
ministration of justice," but only to "those who exercise the
judicial functions." Adams v. Indiana, 214 Ind. 603, 17 N.E.
(2d) 84, 118 ALR 1095 (1938).
peaceful and legal means. Augustus H. Garland, who
went beyond advocacy and actually participated in
armed rebellion against the government,
0 later enjoyed
a peaceful and "legal" career, both in his representation
of private clients and in his representation of the United
States as its Attorney General.7
1
And it is only for the purpose of representing clients
in the settlement or avoidance of their private disputes
and disputes with the existing governments that any
attorney needs a license to practice law. No license is-
and I suppose no license could be-required for the pur-
pose of attempting to change the government. To put it
another way, changing the government is not, and cannot
be made, the exclusive province of lawyers. The state
may not confine advocacy of change of government,
though it may confine the practice of law, to those who
hold a lawyer's license. The lawyer is not practising
law when he advocates governmental change, whether
he advocates that it be achieved by vote or by force. He
functions in such matters in the same capacity as political
scientists, plumbers and other citizens.
To hold the lawyer to a belief in a "principle of legal-
ity" in the practice of law is one thing. To hold him
to a belief in a "principle of legality" as a means of
governmental change is quite another-and the connec-
tion between the two is not made closer than the con-
nection between the technical competence and the po-
litical views of the plumber by referring to "constitutions
as our fundamental source of legality." The extent of
the state's licensing power-its power to exclude from
the ranks of lawyers or plumbers-is reached when it
imposes standards designed to affect the manner of
practicing law and plumbing. The power to license
professions is not a power to license methods of govern-
mental change.
In addition to their "principle of legality," Brown
and Fassett have a principle of morality. The lawyer
who advocates forcible overthrow of the government,
they say, may also be excluded from his profession on
the ground that "he is not of good moral character be-
cause he contemplates criminally reprehensible con-
duct." 7a This idea is the more remarkable because its
70. Ex parte Garland, note 18, supra.
71. See Garland, Experience in The U. S. Supreme Court
(1898). True, there is evidence that in matters of extra-legal
propriety Attorney General Garland was not as sensitive as he
should have been to possible conflicts between his private invest-
ments and his official duties. See Nevins, Grover Cleveland
(1933), 293-295. But this shortcoming does not seem to be
confined to Attorneys General with revolutionary backgrounds
-or even to Attorneys General.
72. Brown and Fassett, note 2, supra, at 502. Since these
remarks were delivered Professor Brown has advised me that
I misinterpret his and Fassett's position on this point-that they
suggest "good moral character" as an established test which
might be employed to embrace the loyalty test, but that they
regard it as a term of art which, at least in this application,
would involve no moral judgment.
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authors apparently would not consider such advocacy
necessarily either immoral or reprehensible on the part
of non-lawyers:
"[An ordinary citizen might believe with utmost
sincerity and devotion to his country that its welfare
required abstention from violence under all circum-
stances, even against invasion. Contrariwise, another
might urge immediate resort to violence to overthrow
a government he believed to be corrupt. Whether
such beliefs are permissible for a lawyer has been
questioned.
73
The suggestion that beliefs which another may hold
"with the utmost sincerity and devotion to his country"
are not "permissible for a lawyer" because "reprehen-
sible" and evidence of lack of "good moral character"
is not only absurd on its face. It is also absurd in the
light of our national experience. It would raise serious
questions about the good moral character of such lawyers
(to name only three) as--
Thomas Jefferson, who said: "I hold it, that a little
rebellion, now and then, is a good thing, and is neces-
sary in the political world as storms in the physical
• . . It is a medicine necessary for the sound health
of government."
74
Alexander Hamilton, who said in The Federalist:
"If the representatives of the people betray their con-
stituents, there is then no resource left but in the exer-
tion of that original right of self-defense which is
paramount to all positive forms of government .... 75
Abraham Lincoln, who said in his First Inaugural:
"This country belongs to the people who inhabit it.
Whenever they shall grow weary of the existing Gov-
ernment, they can exercise their constitutional right
of amending it or their revolutionary right to dismem-
ber or overthrow it."
That highly intelligent lawyers can today call down
upon their profession a double moral standard which
such distinguished lawyers in our history would never
have dreamt of applying to themselves is, it seems to me,
a shocking manifestation of the extent to which hysteria
has carried us.
I have spoken here of that hysteria only as it is ex-
pressed in attempts to deprive lawyers of their consti-
73. Ibid.' 481.
74. Letter to James Madison, January 30, 1787, quoted in
Padover, The Complete Jefferson (1943), 270.
75. The Federalist, No. 28.
tutional rights. I have characterized those attempts as
unique in that most of them originate from the lawyers
themselves. They are also unique in another respect,
which makes them matters of extreme concern to non-
lawyers.
The hysterical men among us are not concerned with
the loyalty of lawyers alone. They have similar pro-
posals-many of them already in effect-to assure the
loyalty of non-lawyers as well. These proposals, like
those for lawyers, would deprive their victims of
cherished constitutional rights. And if the non-lawyer
is to preserve those rights, he needs the assistance of a
lawyer. But the loyalty tests imposed on lawyers
operate to make that assistance more difficult to secure.
Hence, those tests tend to impair another constitutional
right of lawyer and non-lawyer alike--the right to ef-
fective assistance of counsel.
That this is the tendency of such tests for lawyers
is not merely the view of an ivory-tower academician,
or of those who might be accused of excessive preoccu-
pation with civil liberties. In opposing the 1950 ABA
loyalty oath proposal, a twenty-four-man committee of
the Association of the Bar of the City of New York- -
a committee which included the present Attorney Gen-
eral, Herbert Brownell Jr.-said in part:
"The establishment of the oath requirement might
lessen the freedom of the bar to accept the respon-
sibility of representing unpopular causes. At this
time, when Communists are being more frequently
called upon to appear in the courts, it is essential
that they should not be deprived of their conceded
right to be represented by counsel of their own choice.
A lawyer might hesitate to represent accused Commu-
nists lest it be said that such representation constituted
support of an organization of the prohibited kind."' '
Obviously, the same objection runs not only against
loyalty oaths-which is all the committee was there con-
cerned with-but against any kind of loyalty test for
lawyers
This is an additional, and particularly vital, reason
for opposing such tests. If lawyers ever become so in-
timidated by inquiries into their own loyalty that they
fear to assert the constitutional rights of others in loyalty
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